

THE POLITICS OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN COLOMBIA

by Robert H. Dix

I. INTRODUCTION

Governments and political parties differ in their approaches to development. Some stress economic growth under the leadership of an elite, while at the same time limiting as much as possible the broad distribution of economic and social rewards, and limiting political participation. These we may call the developmentalists. Others—revolutionaries comprising a counter-elite—would reconstruct society in the interests of a radical redistribution of income and political power, perhaps, but not necessarily, as a prerequisite for sustained economic growth. Still others, the pluralists, would more nearly balance considerations of economic growth and the distribution of income and other rewards by allowing the more or less free competition of elites and would-be elites.

A fourth approach to development partakes of features of all three of the above, yet melds them in a distinctive combination. This is populism, by which I mean a political movement characterized by the mobilization by (usually marginal) elites of a heterogeneous mass base, beyond or “above” existing attachments, and offering a new cross-sectional identity focusing on a leader, the nation, social justice, or typically all three. Populism thus combines the elite leadership of the developmentalist approach, the mobilizational and redistributive emphases of the revolutionaries, and the heterogeneity or coalitional aspect of pluralism. While not confined to Latin America, nor necessarily dominant there, populism is nonetheless a common, if little understood and often overlooked, approach to development in the region. In particular, it has been notably a more prevalent and more popular approach to development than has been the revolutionary one.

Since 1958 Colombian governments have exemplified, even archetypically, the developmentalist approach toward economic and social policy. They did so until 1974 under the aegis of a rather special political arrangement called the *Frente Nacional*. The *Frente* was a formalized coalition between

Mr. Dix is Professor of Political Science at Rice University.

Colombia's two historic, elite-dominated parties, the Conservative and the Liberal. For the sixteen years between 1958 and 1974 these two parties were to hold—by constitutional fiat—equal numbers of seats in legislative bodies and in appointive posts at all levels of government (including the cabinet). The presidency was to alternate every four years between members of the two parties. The purpose of such an arrangement was to bring to an end the earlier fratricidal warfare between adherents of the two “hereditary hatreds,” and at the same time to forestall a recrudescence of the military dictatorship which in the years 1953-1957 had appeared to threaten the traditional hold of the civilian elites over the Colombian political system. A further objective, implicit but not incidental, was to promote the development of the country under the suzerainty of those same elites.¹

To the surprise of some, the National Front survived for its proffered sixteen years with only slight formal modifications. Furthermore, despite at times significant opposition to the agreement from dissident factions of the two traditional parties, such oppositions hardly challenged the developmentalist stance of the *Frente Nacional*.

By the late 1960s, however, the *Alianza Nacional Popular* (ANAPO) of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the man who had ruled as dictator 1953-1957, had begun to challenge the *Frente* more seriously, and on partially different grounds. For ANAPO attacked the *Frente* not only on the propriety of an institutionalized sharing of power between Colombia's parties, it also sought to appeal to Colombians apart from or “above” their historic partisan loyalties, and on the basis of appeals for social justice and identification with the person and previous regime of the erstwhile dictator.

Founded by Rojas (who had been permitted by the government to return from exile) and a handful of supporters in 1961, ANAPO first ran candidates (as a Conservative faction) in 1962. In subsequent elections it ran candidates under the Liberal label as well. It gained in strength until in 1970 its presidential candidate, General Rojas himself, won 39% of the vote and, in a multi-candidate race, almost the presidency. *Anapistas*, in fact, claimed that they had been fraudulently denied victory over the government's candidate.

Two aspects of the rise of ANAPO especially concern us in this paper. One is the meaning for Colombia of the rise of the first mass party giving priority to income redistribution over economic development “from above.” The second is the significance of the fact that the principal political challenge to developmentalism has taken the form of populism rather than a more strictly class-oriented, Marxist and/or revolutionary movement, which in some political and academic quarters would seem to be the expectation. The implications indeed extend beyond Colombia to suggest some things concerning the nature of political development in Latin America generally.

I will first seek to marshal the empirical evidence to delineate the nature of Colombian populism, and especially to distinguish it from the developmentalist parties of the *Frente Nacional*, as well as from a strictly class-oriented revolutionary party. The evidence is of several kinds. The first encompasses the roots of ANAPO's support in the population and consists largely of a post-election (1970) survey conducted in Bogotá; both pre-electoral and post-electoral surveys, as well as a 1968 survey, carried out in Cali (Colombia's third largest city); and a study of voting by barrio in Bogotá and Medellín (Colombia's second city) based on aggregate data.²

I will then examine, more briefly, the social and political backgrounds of the ANAPO leadership, based in considerable part on the studies of congressional and party leadership carried out at the Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá.³ A content analysis of party programs and the party press lends further support to the analysis. There will follow a brief examination of *Anapista* organization and campaign techniques, based both on the party's own documents and on interviews with *Anapista* officials.

Finally, since ANAPO is no longer wholly what it was in its heyday, either in its characteristics or in its dimensions, we need to examine the changes which have taken place since April 1970, when its candidate nearly won the presidency of Colombia.

Having presented the evidence relating to ANAPO as a political movement, I will conclude by seeking to draw out the developmental and theoretical implications of the analysis as they relate both to Colombia and, more broadly, to political development in Latin America.

II. ANAPO—ELECTORAL SUPPORT

ANAPO, and political movements like ANAPO, pose an initial paradox because, while they draw much of their support on the basis of class alignments within the electorate that were previously quite unfamiliar to the country's partisan politics, they also receive important backing from some of the most tradition-minded elements in the society. In Colombia's case this heterogeneity becomes clear from an analysis of the *Anapista* vote.

There is no question that in the country's largest cities the vote for president in 1970 was strongly polarized along class lines, with the have-nots voting in substantial numbers for ANAPO's candidate, General Rojas. Both surveys and aggregate data show that the vote for ANAPO consistently increases as one descends the social scale, and that some 60-65% of the lower class vote went to ANAPO, a percentage which apparently exceeds that of other Latin American countries with significant class voting such as Chile and Argentina, and is not far behind the percentage of the working class vote going to working class parties in such European countries as Sweden and Italy.⁴

This was a startling development for Colombia, with its two historic multiclass parties. It appeared that ANAPO had brought about a substantial shift, from a "vertical" to a "horizontal" axis of politics, at least in the large cities in the 1970 election.

Certain qualifications need at once to be made, however. In the first place, the available surveys and barrio-level studies only reflect the vote in Colombia's three largest cities, which contain only 20% or so of the nation's population.

Secondly, the real dividing line among the classes in their support for Rojas came not between the lower two classes and the others, but between the middle and lower-middle class, at least in the barrio analysis, where these categories were distinguished (see table 1).

TABLE I
OFFICIAL VOTING RESULTS IN STRATIFIED BARRIOS, BOGOTÁ
(In percentages)

	Pastrana	Rojas	Betancur	Sourdis	Blank	Total
CLASS						
Upper	75.8	8.3	11.9	3.5	.4	100
Upper-middle	67.0	11.9	17.6	3.0	.5	100
Middle	56.4	19.5	20.9	2.4	.8	100
Lower-middle	35.5	50.0	13.0	.8	.7	100
Lower	27.8	62.7	8.3	.3	.8	100
Slum	11.8	84.0	3.0	0.0	1.2	100
TOTAL	40.8	44.6	12.6	1.2	.8	100

Source: Campos and McCamant, p. 60.

Put another way, Rojas received 50% of the vote in lower-middle class barrios, while his principal opponent—the candidate of the *Frente Nacional* coalition—got only 36%.

The authors of the 1970 Cali surveys further show, by means of a kind of causal modeling, that attitudes toward the performance of the *Frente Nacional* government were more strongly and directly correlated with the vote than were variables such as social class.⁵ This suggests that, even in the large cities, ANAPO's 1970 vote may best be viewed as an expression of protest which crosscut social classes, even though ANAPO did appeal more to lower than to higher social strata.

It is further worth noting that ANAPO received disproportionate support in the large cities in 1970 from the 21-30 age group, with the numbers of this age group actually voting approximately doubling between 1968 and 1970.⁶ Age, then, was a socio-economic variable other than class which helped to account for General Rojas's strong urban showing in 1970.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly as concerns ANAPO's large-city vote, one must note the distinction between the lower class in most Latin American countries, including Colombia, and the classic European working class. In Latin America the rate of urbanization considerably outpaces any concomitant availability of industrial employment, and, hence, the formation of a class-conscious proletariat in the European sense. Such a proletariat is the major component neither of the urban lower class in a country like Colombia, nor of the ANAPO vote. ANAPO did receive strong support from manual workers in 1970, according to the sample surveys. Workers were not very numerous in the samples, however, while those workers who were also union members in fact tended to favor other candidates. Among occupational groups, it was shopkeepers and salesmen, including petty tradesmen, as well as domestic servants, who were, proportionately, ANAPO's chief supporters.⁷

Evidence from elsewhere in Latin America further suggests that urban migrants, among whom Rojas showed disproportionate strength in 1970, tend to see themselves as representing individual, rather than group or class, mobility.⁸ Similarly, surveys show a tendency of ANAPO supporters to view its program as providing direct and immediate benefits rather than longer-range structural reforms or changes.⁹

Thus, even while the 1970 vote for ANAPO in the largest cities polarized the electorate along class lines to a degree unprecedented in Colombia, there was much to suggest that class struggle was not necessarily implied. Furthermore, the available evidence concerning voting patterns *outside* the large cities indicates that ANAPO's roots are by no means entirely a product of urban malaise.

True, when the *municipios* of the country are ranked by size into six categories, ANAPO's vote proves to be greater in the largest cities, and there is a noticeable tendency for the average *Anapista* vote to decline as one moves from the larger communities to the smaller. But the latter tendency is neither very consistent category by category nor, in most elections, very great beyond the first category, especially if one takes into account the undoubtedly greater obstacles to opposition organization and anti-establishment voting in the smaller communities.¹⁰ Only when one compares the vote in "very rural" *caseríos* and *corregimientos* with the corresponding department-wide vote does the disparity in *Anapista* strength become truly striking.¹¹ In fact, fully a third of ANAPO's votes in the presidential elections of 1966 and 1970—and almost a half in 1972—came from *municipios* defined as rural.¹²

Finally, it should be noted that more than half of the population of such major cities as Bogotá and Cali is of rural or small town origin,¹³ while the 1970 Bogotá survey (though not the Cali surveys) showed that those who

were born in towns of less than twenty thousand persons had a much greater tendency to vote for ANAPO than did those born in larger communities.¹⁴

Taken together, the foregoing data clearly demonstrate that ANAPO, as the major opposition to the *Frente Nacional* both in dimension and portent, was very far from being merely a product of discontent in Colombia's largest cities, and that even those who were urban in residence were not necessarily urban in their orientations toward politics.

Regional voting patterns further point up the fact that ANAPO's strongholds have included parts of the country that are not particularly urban or "modern." Of the eight (of twenty-two) departments giving 40% or more of their vote to Rojas in 1970, three were indeed those whose capitals were Colombia's three largest cities (Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali). By almost any indicator of development (urbanization, education, income, quality of housing, hospital beds per capita) these departments (plus Atlántico with its capital, Barranquilla) outranked the other Colombian departments, usually by some distance.¹⁵

The other five strong *Anapista* departments, however, including the only three to give Rojas more than 50% of their votes in 1970, were classified by Campos and McCamant as "extractive, high tenancy" departments.¹⁶ This is perhaps something of a misnomer, for one of these, the department of Santander, has an important industrial sector centered around oil production and contains Colombia's fifth largest city (Bucaramanga); another (Boyacá) has a steel mill at Paz del Río. Still, for all five the (1964) portion of the labor force employed in agriculture was over 50% and for three of them more than 60%.¹⁷

Similarly, rank-order correlations at the departmental level, while they show a positive correlation of ANAPO's vote with such indicators of development as literacy (.42), show an even higher correlation with land tenancy (.65).¹⁸ The correlation between religiosity and the vote for ANAPO is a modest .41; nevertheless, the strong ANAPO departments do tend to be high in religiosity (even while others that are high in religiosity are not strongly *Anapista*).¹⁹

The evidence is not wholly satisfactory, but it does seem to suggest that support for ANAPO among the Colombian electorate does not come solely from the more urban and highly developed areas (and not from all of these, as indicated by ANAPO's weakness in the country's fourth largest city, Barranquilla, on the Atlantic Coast), but also from traditionalist regions being penetrated by change, and by migrants from these areas.²⁰

There is a final relevant question concerning the derivation of the ANAPO vote, namely, to which party did that vote go prior to the rise of the new

party? First of all, especially in 1970, ANAPO drew previous abstainers to the polls—presumably including many of the least “modern” and least politically efficacious among the citizenry.²¹ Secondly, although in 1970 in the large cities ANAPO drew relatively more heavily from the Liberals than from the Conservatives, the majority of ANAPO voters, both nationwide and over a number of elections, have tended to be erstwhile Conservatives, and hence somewhat more clerically-oriented and somewhat more rural in background than other Colombians. This is evident both from responses to the Bogotá and Cali surveys and from the fact that, during the days of the *Frente Nacional* when all candidates had by law to run either as Conservatives or as Liberals, *Anapista* candidates running under the Conservative label as a rule garnered more votes than did Liberal *Anapistas*.²² It should also be noted in this connection that ANAPO began its electoral life as a Conservative faction, and that the two times General Rojas himself ran for president under the *Frente Nacional* (1962 and 1970), he ran as a Conservative.

In short, ANAPO's electoral support has derived in considerable part from voters who were previous supporters of the Conservative Party, the principal political bulwark of Colombian traditionalism.

The traditionalist elements of *Anapista* support are further illustrated by certain facts of a non-electoral nature. One of the most vociferous organizations backing General Rojas in 1970 was Patrianal, a reserve officers' association.²³ ANAPO congressmen also manifest a relatively high level of contact with the clergy, and are highest of all the political factions in the number of visits they receive from representatives of peasant groups.²⁴ Supportive groups conspicuously do not include many labor unions. Although ANAPO congressmen report extensive contact with labor union leaders, such contacts do not often include leaders of the major labor confederations, the Union of Colombian Workers (UTC) or the Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC).²⁵ Unions, as organizations, seldom openly back ANAPO.

In summary, then, we have in ANAPO a political movement which in its support is more nearly class-based than any in Colombian history, and more nearly so than most in Latin America, but which is at the same time a broad, heterogeneous coalition including support from some of the more traditionalist redoubts of Colombian political life. Evidence for the latter proposition derives from the nature of those urban elements that disproportionately favor ANAPO; from the size of the communities from which ANAPO's support derives; from the nature of the regions outside the large cities where ANAPO has its principal strength; from the political derivation of the ANAPO vote; and from the identity of those organized groups with which ANAPO has close relationships.

III. ANAPO—LEADERSHIP, PROGRAM, AND ORGANIZATION

Examination of ANAPO's leadership, program, and organization bears out its characterization as a modern mass movement deeply penetrated by elements of traditionalism.

The social backgrounds of ANAPO congressmen show them to be high-status individuals with, however, slightly lower social standing on the average than congressmen of the various factions of the traditional parties.²⁶

In general, *Anapista* leaders are probably best depicted as "marginal" members of the Colombian elite—not usually part of the real "Establishment" or members of elite organizations such as the Jockey Club, but at the same time not differing markedly in status from the elites of the traditional parties.

Of course, it might reasonably be expected from the Conservative political origins of the *Anapista* leaders that they would not represent a genuine counter-elite; and it seems indicative that recent defections from ANAPO, including that of one of Rojas's sons, have been largely in the direction of a return to the Conservative fold.

It is also suggestive of ANAPO's political character that during the years when General Rojas was president-dictator of Colombia, the regime showed greater hostility to the industrial than to the landed elite, which of course has been the bedrock of traditional Colombia.²⁷ Rojas, though not of elite origin, came from a family of small landowners in rural Boyacá.

A final datum of interest concerning *Anapista* leadership is that its representatives in Congress reported relatively fewer contacts with the major economic associations than did those of other parties—except with ACOPI, the Association of Small Industrialists.²⁸ The differences are not great, but are perhaps indicative of a pattern. The members of ACOPI, while of course having high social status vis à vis Colombian society as a whole, are marginal in power and prestige compared, say, to the industrialists who are members of the National Association of Manufacturers (ANDI).

The leadership of ANAPO, then, appears to constitute not a counter-elite having its origin in deprived social strata, but rather a marginal elite seeking fuller access to the status and material rewards of the system.

ANAPO's program meanwhile has also reflected the ambiguity of the movement and its populist nature.²⁹ The ideological and political platform of the party, the party press, and its campaign rhetoric make broad appeals to the "popular classes," and often make vitriolic attacks on the personnel, policies, and institutions of the developmentalist *Frente Nacional*. Verbal assaults on the overall system of privilege in Colombia abound, replete with such assertions as "ANAPO is the revolution." Policy goals in the socio-economic field are portrayed as "socialism á la colombiana," and include nationalization of oil and other mineral resources, as well as of

imports and the Bank of the Republic. The party platform also calls for access to housing for all social classes, measures to stem inflation, and the like.

At the same time, there is little inclination to speak of society in terms of class divisions or the need for deep-seated structural change. Appeals are to "the people" and to "popular unity," rather than to particular classes or to the concept of class struggle. The approach to agrarian policy is indicative, as it often is with Latin American political parties and governments. There is virtually no talk of land redistribution. The stress is instead on the mistakes and maladministration of the governments of the *Frente Nacional* in carrying out the current agrarian reform program, and on the need to form cooperatives and to increase agricultural productivity.

When appeals are directed at specific groups, they are as often middle-status groups such as teachers and retired army officers as they are workers or peasants. Symptomatically, the earlier Rojas regime is praised for the relative absence of strikes.

ANAPO sees itself as flourishing amid the failure of both capitalism and Marxism, with some attendant emphasis on a "communitarian" ethic, on cooperatives, and on the co-management of factories by workers. Its "socialist" stance has often seemed to mean little more than state policies on behalf of the poor and the middle class, with the possible exception of the proposed nationalization of the above-mentioned enterprises. Judging by the behavior and pronouncements of ANAPO's congressional delegation, we find it quite possible that many *Anapistas* do not take too seriously a program "popular" even to this degree.

Finally, the party program has important traditionalist elements. Military terms and references are quite frequent, while the party refers to itself not only as socialist but also as nationalist and Christian. All in all, ANAPO's program—somewhat vague to begin with—is a mixture of populist and traditional appeals with only very modest proposals for fundamental structural change.

Organizationally, in the large urban areas, and especially in Bogotá, ANAPO was, at its peak, the most effective party in Colombia. In this, it resembled a modern mass party, complete with myriad ward- or *barrio*-level organizations, regular dues and carnets, mass rallies, more or less regular party communications media, a centralized command structure, and strict party discipline.³⁰ In rural areas, however, and in many departments, the relationship of the party to its members and followers appears more closely to reflect the traditional roles of patron and client. Relationships within the party hierarchy itself, even in urban areas, also have shown traces of traditional political styles.

Meanwhile ANAPO has always been dependent to an unusual degree, even considering the relatively personalistic factionalism of Colombian

party politics, on the leadership and personalities of General Rojas and his daughter, María Eugenia, the party's candidate for president in 1974. The party media (including both press and radio) contain constant references to, and praise of, both. All command decisions, including the appointment and expulsion of party officers at the departmental level, emanate from the top leadership and are enforced hierarchically. There is little real collective decision-making in the party, and little pretense of it (distinguishing ANAPO from most European mass parties, for example). There is little, either, of the kind of elite collegiality which tends to govern the Liberal and Conservative parties, and little of their decentralization and diffuseness of organization. The role of the leader(s), characteristic of populism, has been paramount.

Therefore, while with regard to mass mobilization ANAPO was in its heyday the most modern party in Colombia, nationwide it bore a number of the organizational traits of Colombia's traditional parties. In the last analysis it has been very much the product of mobilization "from above" by a party leadership centered in a *caudillo* and his family and close associates.

IV. ANAPO—CHANGE AND DECLINE

ANAPO, of course, has not remained entirely what it was at its inception or in its years of early growth. Particularly after its near-victory in the presidential election of April 1970, and its formal founding as a party in June 1971, it has undergone changes—some quite obvious, others more subtle—which bear significantly both on a fully adequate interpretation of ANAPO's role under the *Frente Nacional* and on its future in post-1974 Colombian politics. Such changes do not negate what has already been said about ANAPO in the years of its electoral rise and organizational maturing, but they do introduce certain qualifications.

Data from a 1972 post-electoral survey carried out in Bogotá essentially replicate, although with diminished sharpness, the 1970 data concerning the socio-economic characteristics of the urban ANAPO electorate.³¹ Ideologically, however, ANAPO has in recent years moved noticeably leftward. Comparing ANAPO's "Decalogue" of the 1970 campaign, for example, with María Eugenia's twelve-point platform of 1974, one sees a definite shift of emphasis, both in content and phraseology. Whereas three of the ten points of the "Decalogue" concerned governmental mechanisms and relations with the Church, these matters are not mentioned in the 1974 platform. Instead, there is talk of "the progressive nationalization of basic industries," and of "a profound, drastic, and massive agrarian reform," language that did not appear in 1970.³²

The generational transfer of effective leadership of the party from General Rojas to his daughter—who was always closer to the urban mass base of the *Anapista* electorate than was her father—partly accounts for such changes, as does the entry into the party of intellectuals from other political homes who were seeking in ANAPO a viable alternative to the traditional parties. Partly, though, the apparent change has evidently been a matter of tactics, with ANAPO leaders interpreting the 1972 fall-off in their vote as meaning that ANAPO had to take a stronger class-oriented line in order to make up for the partisan factional vote that had once accrued to it under the restricted competitive conditions of the *Frente Nacional*.³³

As for ANAPO's leadership and organization, María Eugenia had increasingly become the real leader of the party well before her father's death in January 1975. In fact, by the early 1970s Rojas had come to play a largely symbolic and legitimizing role, seldom in direct contact with the party organization. A number of ANAPO's founders and early adherents (although by no means all) had left the ranks, as had some of the Liberals who had joined in the late 1960s. By the accounts of most observers, the party's membership and its grass-roots organization had both fallen well below the peak of 1970.³⁴

Most notably, the party has experienced a marked decline in its electoral fortunes. Having captured 38.7% of the popular vote for president in 1970, its candidates won only 18.8% in the 1972 elections for departmental assemblymen, and a mere 9.4% in the 1974 presidential race.³⁵

What accounts for the fall-off in the *Anapista* vote? The explanation is in the main speculative, but surely includes the following reasons:

1) It seems plausible that the constitution of ANAPO as a third party in 1971 and the approaching end of the National Front's enforced bipartisanship, heralded by the open competition for departmental legislatures and municipal councils in 1972, led many erstwhile Liberals and Conservatives to return to their ancestral partisan homes.

2) The tendency toward radicalization of the party, the more explicitly socialist proposals and class-oriented rhetoric of the 1974 campaign, may have alienated voters,³⁶ just as it drove from the party some of its long-standing loyalists among the leadership, especially in its former Conservative wing. By more clearly defining its programs, ANAPO may well have lost some of its ability to be all things to all men. Moreover, in choosing to make ANAPO somewhat more explicitly class-oriented, the party's leadership may have misinterpreted the new competitive situation and underestimated the historic pulls on Colombia's voters of the country's traditional multiclass parties.³⁷

3) The disappointing performance of those *Anapistas* elected in 1970, not only in Congress but also in departmental assemblies and municipal councils, where they often held a majority, should also be noted.³⁸ There is

little evidence that in any of these legislative bodies *Anapistas* put forward specific programs for the alleviation of the immediate concerns of their constituents. Political bickering, sometimes among *Anapistas* themselves, and an alleged unseemly appetite for positions and perquisites, may have discouraged the party's followers who, by the very nature of their followership, expected instant redress for grievances which no party, in any event, could accomplish in short order.

4) The denial of victory legitimately won in 1970—at least as Rojas's supporters saw it—may, too, have played an important role in the downturn in ANAPO's subsequent electoral fortunes. In a post-electoral survey conducted in 1974 in Bogotá, many former ANAPO voters gave this (that is, the expectation that their candidate would be denied office even if victorious) as the principal reason for not voting for María Eugenia.³⁹

5) In 1974 the fact that the *Anapista* candidate was a woman may also have hurt the party. It was the second most common rationale for their failure to vote for ANAPO given by former ANAPO supporters among the respondents to the 1974 Bogotá survey.⁴⁰ María Eugenia's candidacy may also have caused the disaffection of some of the party's more traditionalist leaders.

6) Finally, it seems probable that the peak attained by ANAPO in 1970 was itself a product of some exceptional circumstances. The vote for Rojas was in considerable part a protest against the *Frente Nacional* and its works, which had had their quintessential embodiment in the outgoing administration of Carlos Lleras Restrepo. The purported emphasis by the Lleras government on "development" at the expense of "social justice," on "technical" as opposed to "human" solutions, fueled the protest, as did scandals in some government agencies. During the course of the campaign, moreover, ANAPO—assisted by the denunciations of spokesmen for the *Frente Nacional*⁴¹—became identified as the principal focus of opposition to the Front. Perhaps even more important, Liberal voters had no Liberal for whom to cast their ballots in 1970. Many apparently turned to the "populist" Rojas, returning to the fold to vote for a Liberal president in 1974.

In sum, during the last year or two of the National Front, ANAPO became somewhat more coherently organized in an ideological sense, and more socialist-oriented, and to that extent less vaguely populist. There was also some change in its leadership and organization. At the same time, and most strikingly, it lost much of its earlier support, although as noted this may have been as much the cause of ideological change as vice versa.

Immediately following its 1974 debacle, ANAPO announced long-range plans for improving and expanding its radio outlets, for making *Alerta* into a daily paper, and for the more effective participation of workers, peasants, and other groups in the life of the party. It claimed that it had attained the important goal of establishing itself as a viable third party in

free competition with Conservatives and Liberals.⁴² Yet ANAPO was clearly badly demoralized, with deep-seated fissures showing between traditionalist and leftist elements in the party.⁴³ With its original *caudillo* dead, its future remained highly uncertain.

V. CONCLUSION

The nature of its organization, as well as aspects of its program and leadership composition, strongly suggest that ANAPO never really constituted a genuine counter-elite, despite its electoral base among the lower social strata of Colombian cities. Rather, it more nearly comprised a movement of dissident or marginal members of the elite manipulating the masses in the *name* of social justice, but essentially to promote their own political/economic advance.

Put another way, ANAPO has represented the political protest of those among both elites and masses who see economic development proceeding without full benefits or full participation accruing to them. It is both led and supported, however, by those who, by and large, see roles for themselves within the (albeit possibly modified) system, rather than by those seeking real structural change. It has indeed—for example, in the largely Conservative origins of its top leaders and the tendency of some of them to return to the fold of the mother party—certain of the attributes of a faction of one of Colombia's traditional parties. In fact, ANAPO has had a good deal of the negative protest movement about it, conjoining a number of disparate groups and political tendencies which for varying reasons opposed the political arrangements or the developmentalist policies of the *Frente Nacional*.

ANAPO is, then, not really opposed to the existing socio-political structure nor is it really a revolutionary party. At the same time, by its appeal to "the people," against the "oligarchs" and across traditional party lines, as well as in its political loyalty to a former military dictator, it has carried at least an implicit threat, not just to the personnel, policies, or mechanics of the *Frente Nacional*, but also to many of the fundamental political and social assumptions of the Colombian system.

Most important for Colombia's developmental future, ANAPO has been instrumental in fostering a partial tilt in the axis of socio-political conflict from an essentially vertical one (between multiclass parties) *in the direction of* a horizontal, class-defined axis, especially, though not exclusively, in the realm of voting behavior. Even should ANAPO fade as a political movement in the later 1970s, it seems unlikely that over the long term partisan competition in Colombia will wholly revert to its previous virtually non-class nature.

Yet while its mass, lower-class dimension has perhaps been ANAPO's most striking and important feature, to characterize it as a genuine class-oriented or revolutionary party omits or distorts significant aspects of its life as a political movement.

Rather, we have in ANAPO what I have called populism, or what Gino Germani has referred to as a "national popular" movement which seems "to represent the peculiar form of intervention of the traditional strata in the national political process in the course of rapid mobilization in countries of delayed industrialization."⁴⁴

What stands out is the ambivalence and ambiguity of such movements, seeking as they do immediate benefits, including upward economic, social, and political mobility for their leaders, and welfare, public works, and entry into the consumer society for their followers, without paying the presumed cost of genuine development by real structural or attitudinal change. A desire for the rewards of development coincides with a kind of resistance to it, or to certain of its aspects or consequences.

There is a tendency for particular populist movements to be short-lived, because of their own internal contradictions and their frequent dependence on a certain leader or given set of circumstances.⁴⁵ But this *type* of movement can be expected to recur—in Colombia and in many other parts of Latin America—as a consequence of the persistence of the fundamental conditions that foster it.

It could, in fact, be argued that populism is the most "natural" type of mass movement for the sort of corporatist societies depicted by Philippe Schmitter as especially characteristic of contemporary Latin American politics. Such societies are rooted in late or delayed development, in which rapid urbanization far outpaces the growth of industrialization and an industrial proletariat, and where mass mobilization is controlled "from above" by governments, parties, and elites. Some of these aspects of late development are in turn reinforced by Hispanic political culture (e.g., in their corporatist aspects) and by external dependency.⁴⁶ In Colombia's case, its long heritage of popular loyalty to vertically-structured parties may enhance its susceptibility to mass mobilization by traditional elites.

Thus, in Colombia and in countries like Colombia, especially in Latin America, populist parties and movements like ANAPO tend to be more significant than strictly class-oriented, Marxist, and/or revolutionary parties, as political responses to the advent of mass suffrage amid the strains and prospects of the early-to-middle stages of the industrial revolution.

More often than revolutionary change under the aegis of a counter-elite, and at least as common as a pluralistic approach, populism, in the guise of marginal elites mobilizing a heterogeneous mass and unified around a leader, is the typical Latin American reaction to developmentalism. It is

perhaps not a coincidence that, when in 1974 ANAPO sought to give its program a more explicitly class-oriented and revolutionary cast, it suffered a marked decline in its fortunes.

NOTES

1. Robert H. Dix, *Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), ch. 6.

2. All of these studies were published by Colombia's Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE) in *Colombia Política* (Bogotá, 1972). One of the studies appearing in the DANE volume has also been published in English, in somewhat revised form, as Judith Talbot Campos and John F. McCamant, *Cleavage Shift in Colombia: Analysis of the 1970 Election* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972). Where similar material appears in both, the English version has been cited, as Campos and McCamant. The DANE publication also includes considerable electoral data, principally for the years 1958-1970, and throughout has been used as the source for such data unless otherwise indicated.

3. Publications so far stemming from this project include Gary Hoskin, Francisco Leal, Dora Rothlisberger, and Harvey Kline, *El Comportamiento Legislativo en Colombia* (Bogotá: Editorial Universidad de los Andes, 1974); and Harvey F. Kline, "Interest Groups in the Colombian Congress: Group Behavior in a Centralized, Patrimonial Political System," forthcoming.

4. Campos and McCamant, pp. 8-9.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-74.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

7. Rodrigo Losada and Miles Williams, "Análisis de la votación presidencial en Bogotá, 1970," in *Colombia Política*.

8. Alejandro Portes, "Urbanization and Politics in Latin America," *Social Science Quarterly* 52 (December 1971): 697-720.

9. Losada and Williams, "Análisis de la votación presidencial," pp. 28-29.

10. See, e.g., Daniel Premo, *Alianza Nacional Popular: Populism and the Politics of Social Class in Colombia, 1961-1970* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1972), pp. 105 and 344.

11. Lars Schoultz, "Urbanization and Changing Voting Patterns: Colombia, 1946-1970," *Political Science Quarterly* 87, no. 1 (March 1972): 40.

12. *Ibid.*, table 5, p. 39.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

14. Campos and McCamant, p. 59.

15. See, e.g., table 6, p. 85, in Fernando Uricoechea, *Modernización y Desarrollo en Colombia 1951-1964* (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional, Departamento de Sociología, 1967). I am also indebted to Professor Wayne Thirsk of the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada, for data made available to me.

16. Campos and McCamant, p. 53.

17. Data provided by Professor Thirsk. One of the departments, César, was formed subsequent to 1964 from some of the more rural parts of the department of Magdalena. The latter in 1964 had 61% of its labor force in agriculture.

18. Campos and McCamant, p. 51. Most such correlations, of somewhat dubious value at a level such as the departmental, tend in any case to be weak due to the diversity of ANAPO's support, thus tending to confirm one of my central points.

19. For data on religiosity (as measured by priestly vocation per capita), see Gustavo Pérez, *El Problema Sacerdotal en Colombia* (Bogotá: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, 1962), p. 66. Four of the five departments which are highest in religiosity are among those most strongly *Anapista*. The correlation is with the 1966 vote for ANAPO.

20. A commercial city, Barranquilla (and the Atlantic Coast region in general), has always been one of independent Colombia's least traditional areas as judged by social customs, family patterns, religiosity, and so forth. Moreover, because of its distance from the more traditional departments, it has received fewer migrants from such areas.

21. Campos and McCamant, p. 101.

22. Losada and Williams, "Análisis de la votación presidencial," pp. 111-112.

23. Campos and McCamant, p. 39.

24. Kline, "Interest Groups in the Colombian Congress," p. 7.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 10, and 18.

26. Hoskin, et al., *El Comportamiento Legislativo en Colombia*.

27. Albert O. Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1965), p. 170.

28. Kline, "Interest Groups in the Colombian Congress," p. 18.

29. The analysis that follows was based primarily on the *Plataforma Ideológica y Política de Alianza Nacional Popular* of 1971, and on selected issues (1969-1972) of the principal ANAPO press organ, *Alerta*.

30. *Plataforma Ideológica . . . 1971*, pp. 62-64.

31. Rodrigo Losada and Gabriel Murillo, *Análisis de las Elecciones de 1972 en Bogotá* (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, Departamento de Ciencia Política, 1973), especially pp. 164-171.

32. For the text of the Decalogue see Saturnino Sepúlveda Niño, *Élites Colombianos en Crisis* (Bogotá, 1970), pp. 74-77; the 1974 platform was published in a pamphlet entitled *Bases de una Nueva Colombia*.

33. See *El Espectador*, (Bogotá), April 24, 1972, p. 2A.

34. An ANAPO official admitted a 25% diminution in an interview, Bogotá, July 23, 1974.

35. The above calculations were based on data from Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, *Estadísticas Electorales: 1972* (Bogotá, 1972) and from preliminary 1974 figures provided the author by the Registraduría.

36. There is little direct evidence to support this interpretation, however. The decline in the 1974 vote for ANAPO was proportionate in urban and rural areas.

37. Rojas's son-in-law saw the 1970 elections as portending a class struggle, despite what he claimed were ANAPO's efforts to prevent it; *Revista Javeriana* 73, no. 365 (June 1970): 529-538.

38. For María Eugenia's reply to such charges ("we are being slandered") see *El Siglo* (Bogotá), Feb. 21, 1972, p. 6.

39. Gabriel Murillo, interview, Bogotá, July 24, 1974. This coincides with the attitudes of *Anapistas* expressed in the wake of the 1970 election that they had been denied their rightful victory. See Campos and McCamant, pp. 68-69.

40. Gabriel Murillo, interview, July 24, 1974. On the other hand, 73% of the respondents in the 1972 Bogotá survey indicated that being a woman was no obstacle to becoming president of Colombia: Losada and Murillo, p. 217.

41. The Bogotá newspaper, *El Tiempo*, led in this respect; cf. Premo, *Alianza Nacional Popular*, p. 344.

42. *Alerta*, April 24, 1974, pp. 3, 4, and 5.

43. A high ANAPO official asserted following the 1974 election that María Eugenia was at the center of the party ideologically, and that she was a political pragmatist who would move ANAPO in whichever direction political survival seemed to indicate; interview, Bogotá, July 23, 1974.

44. Gino Germani, *Política y Sociedad en una Epoca de Transición* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós, 1965), p. 157.

45. The movement headed by Carlos Ibáñez del Campo in Chile (1952-1958) is a classic example of the frequently ephemeral nature of such movements; that of Getulio Vargas in Brazil is more ambiguously so. The Peronist movement in Argentina has of course been something of an exception.

46. Philippe Schmitter, "Paths to Political Development in Latin America," in *Changing Latin America*, ed. Douglas A. Chalmers (New York: Columbia University, The Academy of Political Science, 1972), pp. 83-105.